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Abstract
Family relations in Syria are governed by a plurality of per-
sonal status laws and courts. This plurality manifests itself on
a variety of levels, including statutory, communal and indi-
vidual. In this article, the author argues that, albeit this plu-
rality, Syrian personal status law is also characterised by the
prevalence of shared, gendered norms and views on marital
life. Based on fieldwork conducted in a Catholic and a
shar’iyya personal status courts in Damascus in 2009, the
author examines the shared cultural understandings on mar-
ital relationships that were found in these courts, and as laid
down – most importantly – in the respective Catholic and
Muslim family laws. The article maintains that the patriar-
chal family model is preserved and reinforced by the various
personal status laws and by the various actors which operat-
ed in the field of personal status law. Finally, two Catholic
case studies are presented and analysed to demonstrate the
importance and attachment to patriarchal gender norms in
the Catholic first instance court of Damascus.
Keywords: Syria, personal status law, Eastern Catholic law,
patriarchal family, marital obligations
1 Introduction
Personal status1 or family law in Syria is characterised
by legal plurality, as a multiplicity of personal status
* Esther Van Eijk is a postdoc researcher at Maastricht University, The
Netherlands. She recently defended (September 2013) her Ph.D. thesis
entitled ‘Family Law in Syria: A Plurality of Laws, Norms, and Legal
Practices’ at Leiden University, the Netherlands. This study is based on
her PhD fieldwork (including interviews and participant observation)
conducted in March-April 2008, and October 2008-July 2009 in Syria.
1. Personal status law is also commonly referred to as ‘family law’, for that
reason I use the terms ‘family law’ and ‘personal status law’ inter-
changeably. The term ‘statut personnel’ originates from Medieval
Europe and was used to denote rules and regulations concerning the
status and capacity of persons, vis-à-vis the term ‘statut réel’, which
referred to matters connected to property (see W.A. Bewes, ‘The Theo-
ry of the Statutes’, 4 Journal of Comparative Legislation and Interna-
tional Law 3, at 97-103 (1922)). The term ‘personal status’ (in Arabic:
ahwal al-shakhsiyya) was only introduced in Arab legal writings in the
late nineteenth century, most notably by Muhammad Qadri Pasha in
Egypt (J.J. Nasir, The Islamic Law of Personal Status (2002), at 34 ff.;
A.E.A. Sonbol, ‘“The Woman Follows the Nationality of Her Husband”:
Guardianship, Citizenship and Gender’, 1 Hawwa: Journal of Women of
the Middle East and the Islamic World, 86-117, at 89-90 (2003).
laws and courts are recognised to operate within the
legal framework of the state. Consequently, family rela-
tions in Syria are governed by a variety of religiously
based (to varying degrees) personal status laws and
courts, creating a complex legal system of parallel and
sometimes competing jurisdictions divided along com-
munal lines. In this article, based on fieldwork research
in Damascus, I will maintain that, albeit this plurality,
Syrian personal status law is also characterised by the
prevalence of shared cultural or moral norms and values
about marriage, divorce, gender relations, and family
relations, irrespective of the religious affiliation.
Numerous ethnographic studies have been published on
Muslim family courts and other practices of personal
status law in the Middle East and North Africa.2 How-
ever, there is a lack of a more integrated, convergent
understanding of Middle Eastern family law, i.e. studies
that include both Muslim and non-Muslim (e.g. Christi-
an) legal practices. Or, as Mariz Tadros puts it in her
article on the ‘othering’ of non-Muslims in relation to
personal status law in Egypt, ‘There has been a conspic-
uous tendency in literature on family law in the Arab
world to deal separately with Muslim and non-Muslim
family legislation as if it affects two communities who
inhabit two completely separate and isolated worlds
where there is no convergence, engagement or interac-
tion.’3 I agree with Tadros’ observation that family law
in the Middle East has too often been regarded from a
purely Islamic point of view; thereby also ignoring the
laws and legal practices of non-Muslims in the region.
That is why in this article, I will present a combined
analysis of two types of jurisdictions, namely, Muslim
2. See, e.g.: L. Buskens, Islamitisch recht en familiebetrekkingen in Ma-
rokko (1999); J. Carlisle, ‘Rules, Negotiation, Claims and Counter
Claims: Judicial Discretion in a Damascus Shari‘a Court’ (unpublished
PhD thesis, University of London, 2007); Z. Mir-Hosseini, Marriage on
Trial. Islamic Family Law in Iran and Morocco (2000); A. Moors, Wom-
en, Property and Islam: Palestinian Experiences, 1920-1990 (1995);
N. Shehada, Justice without Drama. Enacting Family Law in Gaza City
Sharî‘a Court (2005); N. Sonneveld, Khul‘ Divorce in Egypt: Public
Debates, Judicial Practices, and Everyday Life (2012); M. Voorhoeve,
Gender and Divorce in North Africa: Sharia, Custom and Personal Sta-
tus Law in Tunisia (forthcoming); L. Welchman, Beyond the Code:
Muslim Family Law and the Shari‘a Judiciary in the Palestinian West
Bank (2000).
3. M. Tadros, ‘The Non-Muslim “Other”: Gender and Contestations of
Hierarchy or Rights’, 7 Hawwa: Journal of Women of the Middle East
and the Islamic World, 111-143, at 111 (2009).
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and Catholic personal status law in Syria, on the subject
of marital relationships.
My research was conducted over a twelve-month peri-
od, 2008-2009, and included interviews,4 recurrent
informal interactions with (legal) experts (particularly
lawyers) and court observations. Syria’s political climate
posed challenges in gaining access to the courts, court
records and other relevant material. The possibility of
conducting frequent court observations in the shar‘iyya5
courts of Damascus was limited due to various reasons,
most importantly because I did not have the required
clearance from the authorities.6 However, through my
lawyers’ network, I gained access to three types of per-
sonal status courts, i.e. a shar‘iyya court, a Catholic
court, and a Greek Orthodox court.7 In the period Feb-
ruary until July 2009, I observed court cases in these
three courts in Damascus. During my presence in these
courts, I noticed that the same themes were constantly
addressed: the ideal of marriage, the proper role of hus-
bands and (in particular) wives, i.e. the husband as the
provider and head of the household and so on. Regard-
less of their legal and religious differences, these person-
al status courts seemed to be united in their shared
understandings on gender, family relations, social norms
and behaviour.
In this article, I will focus on the cultural or patriarchal
views and norms on marital relationships, family and
gender, which were shared amongst the Syrian Muslim
and Catholic communities. I will argue that in the
Syrian family law context, the patriarchal family model
is preserved and reinforced by the various personal sta-
tus laws and by the various actors which operate in the
field of personal status law. First, I will briefly outline
the legal framework within which these laws and norms
operate; followed by a discussion of the content of the
Muslim personal status law with regard to the marital
relationship. The second half of this article will focus on
the Catholic personal status law, by providing some
general observations about legal regulation of a Catholic
marriage and the dissolution thereof. Finally, two Cath-
olic case studies will be presented and analysed to dem-
onstrate the importance and attachment to patriarchal
gender norms in the Catholic first instance court of
Damascus.
4. During my fieldwork, I spoke to a range of people, including lawyers,
judges, women’s rights activists, representatives of civil society groups,
members of Parliament, diplomats and representatives of religious
organisations.
5. I chose to leave the adjective shar‘iyya in relation to the courts untrans-
lated because I do not want to use the term ‘Muslim’ or ‘Islamic’ to
denote this type of court. The shar‘iyya courts are regarded as the gen-
eral personal status courts because, even though the majority of their
cases involve Muslims, they also have (limited) jurisdiction over non-
Muslims. Besides, I do not want to label them as religious courts;
shar‘iyya judges are civil servants trained at secular law faculties, unlike
the Christian courts, where priests act as judges.
6. Just before I finalised my research plans in the spring of 2007, the Min-
ister of Justice had issued a regulation denying foreigners access to
Syrian court rooms.
7. In Syria, court sessions are generally open to public.
2 Pluralistic Family Law in
Syria
Syria is a multi-religious and multi-ethnic country, with
a Muslim majority and several religious minorities, most
notably various Christian denominations. There are no
official statistics available on religion, but according to
estimates, Sunni Muslims make up around 74 per cent
of Syria’s estimated 21 million population, around
16 per cent are non-Sunni Muslims, such as Druze,
Shi‘a and ‘Alawi, and about 10 per cent of the popula-
tion belongs to various Christian denominations.8
The different religious communities have since long
enjoyed the right to regulate and administer their family
relations according to their respective religious laws.
This situation of legal plurality was partly inherited
from earlier, predecessor dynasties and rulers; in partic-
ular, the political and legal system of the Ottomans was
foundational to Syria’s legal system. The Islamic Otto-
man Empire, like Syria today, was a multi-religious
state. In addition to its Muslim subjects, the Empire had
a significant number of non-Muslim subjects, i.e. dhim-
mis – a dhimmi is a non-Muslim living under Islamic
rule. Non-Muslim Ottomans were guaranteed certain
privileges under the so-called millet system.9 The reli-
gious or confessional communities (millets) enjoyed the
right to apply their own religious laws; also in matters of
personal status, most importantly marriage and divorce.10
In the nineteenth century (1839-1876), the Ottoman
government introduced a series of far-reaching reforms
(Tanzimat) to meet the challenges of social change. The
Edict of Humayun, issued in 1856, stated that all
Ottoman subjects were regarded equal before the law, in
taxes, government positions, and military service,
regardless of their religion. Hence, the Ottoman state
introduced the concept of ‘citizenship’11 and with that –
8. In addition, a few Jewish and Yazidi families still live in Syria (see Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency, The World Fact Book (online edition, 2013), at
<www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sy.html>
(accessed 17 June 2013); International Religious Freedom
Report (2012), available online at <www .state .gov/ j/ drl/ rls/ irf/
religiousfreedom/ index .htm ?year= 2012& dlid= 208412> (accessed
17 June 2013).
9. For an analysis of the concept ‘millet’ (including the millet-system), see
M.H. van den Boogert, ‘Millets: Past and Present’, in A.N. Longva and
A.S. Roald (eds.), Religious Minorities in the Middle East: Domination,
Self-Empowerment, Accommodation (2012), 27-45.
10. However, this protected position came with certain conditions, such as
payment of the poll-tax (jizya), prohibition to carry arms, living in seg-
regated areas, and dress in distinctive style. In addition, dhimmis could
not testify against Muslims in court and they were excluded from high
public offices (A.N. Longva, ‘From the Dhimma to the Capitulations:
Memory and Experience of Protection in Lebanon’, in Longva and
Roald, above n. 9, 47-69, at 49).
11. However, the formal nationality law was only passed in 1869 (see K.H.
Karpat, ‘Millets and Nationality: The Roots of the Incongruity of Nation
and State in the Post-Ottoman Era’, in B. Braude and B. Lewis (eds.),
Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire. The Functioning of a Plu-
ral Society (1982) 141-169, at 162-163).
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at least on a national level – abolished the millet
regime.12 The separate status of Muslims and non-Mus-
lims in family law matters, however, continued to exist,
for the Edict of Humayun reaffirmed that the privileges
granted to all the non-Muslim communities would be
maintained.13 In spite of the official abolishment of the
dhimmi status, the millet system was never completely
erased in all parts of the Empire.14 Remnants of the
Ottoman millet system can still be found in varying
degrees in Egypt, Lebanon, Israel and Syria today.
The main law in Syria that regulates family relations
today is the 1953 Syrian Law of Personal Status15
(qanun al-ahwal al-shakhsiyya; hereafter SLPS); it is
predominately based on Islamic legal sources, particu-
larly Hanafi fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence).16 The SLPS is
the general law because it applies to all Syrians, irre-
spective of their religion (Article 306 SLPS).17 This
means that non-Muslims, for example, also have to refer
to a shar‘iyya court (i.e. the competent court to hear
cases under the SLPS) for certain specified matters,
including, most notably, the determination of paternity
(nasab) and legal guardianship (wilaya).18
That said, conversely – or perhaps more importantly –
Article 306 also stipulates that, following the subsequent
two articles, the Druze community (Article 307), the
Jewish community and the various Christian communi-
ties (Article 308) are exempted from numerous SLPS
provisions and are allowed (instead) to apply their own
laws, most importantly with regard to marriage and
divorce.19 In other words, the various Christian laws are
considered special laws, as exemptions to the general
law, i.e. the SLPS. Hence, family relations in Syria are
governed by a multiplicity of personal status laws and
courts that regulate matters of personal status, including
12. R.H. Davidson, ‘Tanzimat’, in P. Bearman et al. (eds.), Encyclopaedia of
Islam, Vol. X, 2nd edn (2000), 201-209; D.D. Grafton, The Christians
of Lebanon: Political Rights in Islamic Law (2003), at 75.
13. Van den Boogert, above n. 9, at 35.
14. Karpat, above n. 11, at 165-166.
15. The SLPS, Law No. 59, was promulgated on 17 September 1953 and
amended in 1975, 2003 and 2010.
16. See Explanatory Memorandum to the SLPS, M. ‘Atari (ed.), qanun al-
ahwal al-shakhsiyya (Law of Personal Status) (2006), at 5-13.
17. It is important to note that the SLPS does not make a distinction
between Sunni and Twelver Shi‘i, Isma‘ili or ‘Alawi Muslims. Interesting-
ly, the situation is different in Lebanon, where each religious group has
its own personal status law and courts, including the different Muslim
communities. In other words, in Lebanon each religious community is
equal to the other, and the personal status law for Sunni Muslims is just
one of the fourteen laws (Tadros, above n. 3, at 114).
18. Art. 535-547 of the Law of Judicial Procedures (qanun usul al-mahaki-
mat), Law No. 84/1953 with amendments, sets out the jurisdiction of
the shar‘iyya courts.
19. For a similar situation in Egypt, see M.S. Berger, Sharia and Public Poli-
cy in Egyptian Family Law (2005), at 27 ff. In Morocco, Algeria and
Tunisia, on the other hand, this plurality in the legal system was abroga-
ted (E.A. Mayer, ‘Reform of Personal Status Laws in North Africa: A
Problem of Islamic or Mediterranean Laws?’, 49 Middle East Journal 3,
432-446, at 433 (1995)).
marriage, dower, dissolution of marriage, maintenance,
child custody, and succession.20
The already complex situation of legal plurality is fur-
ther complicated by the unequal position for Muslims
and non-Muslims in matters of personal status. This
affects especially the non-Muslim minorities, for exam-
ple, in the event of an interreligious marriage or when
one of the (usually Christian) spouses converts to Islam,
for example, to obtain a divorce. When a spouse coverts
to Islam (the other way around is not possible), the
SLPS becomes the applicable law and the shar‘iyya
courts are considered the competent courts.21 This also
means that when a non-Muslim father or mother con-
verts to Islam, the religious identity of the converted
parent automatically devolves upon the children. Conse-
quently, the converted Muslim parent can demand full
custody over the children. In the past, the shar‘iyya
courts have generally rewarded such requests in favour
of the Muslim parent. Hence, the plurality in personal
status does not entail equality of laws and jurisdictions
of the different religious communities.22 Rather, it is an
imbalanced plurality, as the SLPS and the shar‘iyya
courts clearly have supremacy over the other laws and
courts.23
3 Patriarchal Family Model
According to Wedeen, Syrian families are commonly
patriarchal, meaning that (senior) men are the head of
the family, with women and younger family members in
a more subordinate role.24 In my research, I showed that
the patriarchal family model25 was not only maintained
in family relations but also laid down, in varying
degrees, in Syria’s family laws, similar to many Arab
20. This latter matter, i.e. succession or inheritance, was only added in Sep-
tember 2010 with the amendment of Art. 308 SLPS. As of 2010, the
specified matters falling under the jurisdiction of the Christian and Jew-
ish communities over personal status matters (under Art. 308) now also
extends to inheritance and bequests, whereas earlier this matter
belonged to the competence of the shar‘iyya courts.
21. M.S. Berger, ‘The Legal System of Family Law in Syria’, 49 Bulletin
d’Études Orientales, 115-127, at 124-125 (1997).
22. For a more elaborate discussion (including examples) of this situation of,
what I call, ‘asymmetrical plurality’ see the first two chapters of my PhD
thesis (above n. *).
23. For a similar situation in Egypt, see Berger (2005), above n. 19, at 46;
and Tadros, above n. 3, at 126 ff. Georges observes similar legislative
and legal practices in most Arab countries, including Syria, see N.
Georges, Le droit des minorités. Le cas de chrétiens en Orient arabe
(2012), at 289-294.
24. L. Wedeen, Ambiguities of Domination: Politics, Rhetoric, and Symbols
in Contemporary Syria (1999), at 51.
25. Buskens defines the ‘patriarchal family model’ as follows: ‘[a] model for
family life in which senior men are entitled to a dominant position over
subordinate women and children. This male dominance, grounded in
their position as husbands and fathers, is expressed in norms about gen-
der, descent, obedience, sexuality, the use of space and freedom of
movement, as well as the economy of the household’ (L. Buskens,
‘Recent Debates on Family Law Reform in Morocco: Islamic Law as Pol-
itics in an Emerging Public Sphere’, 10 Islamic Law and Society 1,
70-131, at 75, n. 5, 2003).
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personal status laws.26 The laws privilege men, in par-
ticular men from the patrilineal line, in numerous ways,
i.e. in child custody, inheritance, divorce, choice of mar-
riage partner, passing on religious identity and citizen-
ship to children,27 household division of labour, and
authority and obedience in marriage. Certain matters
are typically associated with Muslim family law (e.g. the
dower and polygyny) or, on the contrary, Christian fam-
ily law (e.g. the sacramental marriage and the prohibi-
tion of divorce); however, the underlying structures are
generally the same. The patriarchal family model is
enshrined in the various laws of personal status, both in
the SLPS and the different Christian personal status
laws,28 and that contributes to the preservation and con-
firmation of that model in the Syrian legal context. For
example, when we look at the marital relationship, we
find that almost all laws oblige the husband to provide
for his wife and children, and the wife, in return, is
obliged to take care of the household and the children
and obey her husband (see below).
3.1 Marriage According to the SLPS:
Maintenance vs. Obedience
The SLPS starts with the definition of marriage; Article
1 reads as follows: ‘Marriage is a contract between a man
and a woman, who is lawfully permitted to him, with
the aim to establish a bond for a joint life and procrea-
tion.’29 The marriage contract is an essential element in
a Muslim marriage, for only a valid contract can gener-
ate legal effects, most importantly rights and duties for
the two contracting parties.
Various studies on Muslim personal status laws empha-
sise the reciprocal nature of the marital bond, in that the
husband’s main legal obligation is his liability to pay
maintenance to his wife and that her main legal obliga-
tion, on the other hand, is to be obedient and sexually
available to her husband.30 This maintenance–obedience
divide has been described as the ‘patriarchal gender con-
tract’31 or the ‘patriarchal bargain’32 and has been laid
down in various laws of personal status in the Arab
26. See Van Eijk, above n. *; V.M. Moghadam, ‘Engendering Citizenship,
Feminizing Civil Society: The Case of the Middle East and North Africa’,
25 Women & Politics 1/2, 63-87, at 69 (2003).
27. Syrian mothers are unable, under the Nationality Law (Legislative
Decree 276, 24 November 1969), to pass on their nationality to their
children (see Van Eijk, above n. *).
28. The Christian personal status laws in Syria are: the Greek Orthodox
Personal Status Law (Law No. 23, 27 June 2004); the Syriac Orthodox
Personal Status Law (Law No. 10, 6 April 2004); Armenian Orthodox
Personal Status Law (number and date unknown); the Catholic Law of
Personal Status (Law No. 31, 18 June 2006); the Evangelical (or Protes-
tant) Law of Personal Status (1952, exact number and date unknown).
29. ‘Atari, above n. 16, at 20.
30. See, e.g., Buskens (1999), above n. 2, at 185-190; N. Shehada, ‘House
of Obedience: Social Norms, Individual Agency and Historical Contin-
gency’, 5 Journal of Middle Eastern Women’s Studies 10, 24-49, at 28
ff. (2009); Sonneveld, above n. 2, at 17 ff.; J.E. Tucker, Women, Fami-
ly, and Gender in Islamic Law (2008), at 50-56; L. Welchman, ‘A Hus-
band’s Authority: Emerging Formulations in Muslim Family Laws’, 25
International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 1, at 1–23 (2011).
31. V.M. Moghadam, Women, Work and Economic Reform in the Middle
East and North Africa (1998).
32. D. Kandiyoti, ‘Bargaining with Patriarchy’, 2 Gender and Society 3, at
274-290 (1988).
Muslim world.33 It should be noted, however, that in
the last decades several Arab states have changed their
family laws with regard to the maintenance–obedience
divide, most notably by leaving out the wife’s duty of
obedience to her husband34 but, at the same time, main-
taining the husband’s obligation to provide maintenance
for the wife.35 Syria, however, always retained the main-
tenance–obedience divide; the SLPS views marriage as
a relationship based on exchange of rights and duties:
the husband will take care of the wife, in exchange for
her cohabitation and obedience.
According to the SLPS, a husband’s ‘first’ financial
obligation is to pay his wife a dower (mahr). When a
wife receives the prompt dower, she is obliged to live
with her husband, provided he prepares a suitable house
for her (Article 66 SLPS).36 Next to paying a dower, the
husband has to pay his wife maintenance (nafaqa). This
maintenance obligation include, most importantly, a
marital home, clothing, food, and medical care (Article
71 SLPS). If a husband fails to provide maintenance to
his wife, she can go to court and file a nafaqa claim
against him, forcing him to fulfil his obligations (Article
71.2 SLPS).37 A husband, on the other hand, is entitled
to cease maintenance payments if the wife fails to keep
her end of the ‘patriarchal bargain’, namely, obedience
to him and in particular to cohabit with him. The finan-
cial obligations of the husband are inextricably bound
up with her legal obligation to cohabit and obey him.
As mentioned earlier, I managed to get permission from
one shar‘iyya judge (hereafter ‘judge Ibrahim’), presid-
ing over one of the six shar‘iyya courts of Damascus
proper, to sit in on his court sessions.38 During my visits
to Damascus’ main courthouse, which also housed judge
Ibrahim’s court, the courtrooms, the halls and corridors
were usually packed with court personnel, lawyers, liti-
gants, witnesses and family members, including infants.
Judges would go back and forth between the courtrooms
and their offices; litigants (predominantly, in my obser-
vation, lower or middle-class women), witnesses and
33. V.M. Moghadam, ‘Patriarchy in Transition: Women and the Changing
Family in the Middle East’, 35 Journal of Comparative Family Studies 2,
137-162, at 145 (2004); Tucker, above n. 30, at 73-74; Welchman
(2011), above n. 30, at 10-11.
34. For example, Algeria (2005), Libya (1984), Morocco (2004), Tunisia
(1993) and (South) Yemen (1974).
35. L. Welchman, Women and Muslim Family Laws in Arab States: A Com-
parative Overview of Textual Development and Advocacy (2007), at
94-97.
36. A dower is generally divided into two parts, namely a prompt (mahr
mu‘ajjal or mahr muqaddam) and a deferred dower (mahr mu’ajjal or
mahr mu’akhkhar). The prompt dower ought to be paid upon conclu-
sion of the marriage contract and the deferred part has to be paid when
the marriage is terminated due to an irrevocable divorce or death (Arts.
55 and 56 SLPS).
37. According to the professional arbiters that where assigned to judge
Ibrahim’s court (see below), the majority of the plaintiffs in judicial
divorce (tafriq) cases were female and commonly complained about
their husbands failing to provide maintenance for her and the children
because he, for example, used alcohol or drugs (office judge Ibrahim,
Damascus shar‘iyya court, 21 May 2009).
38. I sat in judge Ibrahim’s courtroom approximately twenty times (i.e.
days), where I observed at least 40 cases. The majority of the cases pre-
sented to the court involved divorce cases, most of them initiated by
women.
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family members patiently waiting their turn, sometimes
for hours.
During my presence in judge Ibrahim’s court, I once
observed a case where a husband tried to wiggle himself
out of his dower payment obligation by trying to prove
that ‘valid seclusion’ (al-khalwa al-sahiha) had not taken
place, which means that the couple did not have the
opportunity to consummate the marriage.39 Consumma-
tion of the marriage (dukhul) can be a matter of
importance in the dissolution of a marriage, for only
after sexual intercourse do the judicial and financial
consequences of the marriage become effective. For
instance, when a husband claims he has divorced his
wife before the marriage was consummated (see example
above) and non-consummation is subsequently estab-
lished by the court, the husband can be excused from
paying his wife the full dower amount (Article 58
SLPS).
The issue of cohabitation is closely connected to the
concept of disobedience (nushuz), for cohabitation
implies sexual availability of the wife to her husband,
which is an obligation upon her side. A wife may forfeit
her right to maintenance if she works outside the house
without her husband’s consent (Article 73) or if she is
considered disobedient (nashiza) to her husband. A wife
can be considered disobedient if she leaves the conjugal
home without a lawful reason or if she prevents her hus-
band from entering the house (Article 75). Accordingly,
if it is established that a wife is disobedient, she loses her
right to maintenance, for as long as she is disobedient
(Article 74). If the husband, however, did not live up to
his part of the ‘patriarchal bargain’ because he did not
yet pay the prompt dower or if he did not prepare a suit-
able marital home for her, she may refuse to cohabit
with him (Article 72.2). In such an event, she is not con-
sidered disobedient and she will not lose her right to
maintenance.40
Similar to the situation where a wife can take legal
action against her husband when he fails to provide
maintenance, a husband can take legal action against his
rebellious wife. A husband can go to court and claim his
wife is disobedient when she refuses to return to the
conjugal home. In other words, he can file a so-called
mutaba‘a claim, which (in this context) I translate with
the phrase ‘marital obedience’.41 The court may recog-
nise a claim for marital obedience, i.e. his claim to be
discharged from performance to pay, when the wife per-
39. When the court establishes that a couple spent a reasonable amount of
time alone together, it is assumed they had sexual intercourse, and the
marriage is considered consummated. For a more detailed analysis on
the (non-)consummation of the marriage in the Syrian context, includ-
ing examples, see Van Eijk, above n. *, and Carlisle, above n. 2.
40. Vincent-Grosso shows in her study on judicial practices in Tunisia,
where similar legal provisions on the subject of cohabitation apply, that
it is very difficult for a Tunisian husband to prove his wife abandoned
the marital home ‘without justification’, as the judges tended to give
the wives the benefit of the doubt in these cases (S. Vincent-Grosso,
‘Maktub: An Ethnography of Evidence in a Tunisian Divorce Court’, in
M. Voorhoeve (ed.), Family Law in Islam. Divorce, Marriage and Wom-
en in the Muslim World (2012) 171-198, at 189-191.
41. Although more literally it would come closer to the meaning of ‘to fol-
low’, meaning that a wife has to ‘follow’ her husband.
sistently refuses to ‘follow’ her husband and return to
the marital home.42 The deterrent effect of an official
court ruling declaring a woman disobedient may per-
suade her to return to the conjugal home, or even
threatening to file such a claim can already compel a
wife to return home.43
Interestingly, the issue of mutaba‘a is mentioned in Arti-
cle 308 SLPS as one of the specified matters falling
under the jurisdiction of the Christian judges. In the
following section, I will elaborate more on marital rights
and duties, including the issue of marital obedience in
the Catholic context.
3.2 Catholic Marriage: Marriage as a Sacrament
About 10 per cent of the population belongs to one of
the Christian denominations. The various Christian
communities of Syria can be divided into three groups:
the largest group are the Orthodox Christians (est.
704,200 souls), the Catholic churches (est. 204,600
members), and the Protestants or Evangelicals (est.
20,100).44 Nearly every denomination or group has its
own family law, including, for example, the Greek
Orthodox Personal Status Law (2004), the Syriac
Orthodox Personal Status Law (2004), and the Catholic
Law of Personal Status (2006). As stated earlier, follow-
ing Article 308 of the SLPS, the Christian communities
are competent to administer their own religious regula-
tions in certain specified matters of personal status,
most importantly, betrothal, marriage, marital obedi-
ence, wife’s and children’s maintenance, annulment and
dissolution of marriage, nursing and inheritance. In my
research, due to access and time restrictions, I focused
on the Catholic community. Through a befriended law-
yer, I gained access to the first instance court of Damas-
cus, where I observed court cases from February till
June 2009.45
The Catholic communities in Syria are governed by the
Catholic Law of Personal Status46 (hereafter CLPS),
Law No. 31, promulgated on 18 June 2006.47 The
CLPS is, for the most part, based on the Code of Can-
ons of the Eastern Churches, originally published in
42. M.F. Shaqfa, sharh ahkam al-ahwal al-shakhsiyya: li-l-muslimin wa-l-
nasara wa-l-yahud (Explaining the Law of Personal Status: Muslims,
Christians, and Jews) (1998), at 314-315.
43. Sonneveld, in her study on divorce practices in Egypt, argues that Cair-
ene husbands often file an obedience (ta‘a) claim in response to a judi-
cial khul‘ divorce request filed by their wives, as a way of stalling the
divorce proceedings or to ‘redeem [their] shattered pride’ (see above
n. 2, at 125-128). During my presence in judge Ibrahim’s court, I never
came across a case which involved a mutaba‘a claim but this does not
– obviously – rule out the possibility that Damascene husbands
employed the same strategy, i.e. file a claim for ‘marital obedience’, in
response to, for example, a wife’s nafaqa claim.
44. All the figures related to Christians cited here date back to 1995 and are
cited in Y. Courbage and P. Fargues, Christians and Jews under Islam
(1998), at 209.
45. The same befriended lawyer also opened the door to the Greek Ortho-
dox court of Damascus, where I observed a few dozen court cases in
the period April-June 2009.
46. In Arabic: qanun al-ahwal al-shakhsiyya li-l-tawa’if al-kathulikiyya.
47. In addition to the CLPS, the Catholic courts also resort to Chapter VII
‘Marriage’ of the Code of Canons of the Eastern Churches in its entire-
ty, i.e. Canons 776-866. These canons are added as a supplement (in
Arabic) to the CLPS and have direct legal effect.
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Latin as the Codex Canonum Ecclesiarum Orientalium
(hereafter CCEO), issued by the late Pope John Paul II
in 1990. The CCEO governs the ecclesial life of the
Eastern Churches and covers various branches of the
church, including the organisation of the church, the
clergy, religious practices such as prayer, celebration of
the Eucharist and other sacraments, most importantly
(for this study), marriage.
Whereas the SLPS describes marriage as a contract
between a man and a woman, the CCEO, on the other
hand, considers a Christian marriage a sacrament (sirr
al-zawaj):
‘By the marriage covenant, founded by the Creator
and ordered by His laws, a man and woman by irrev-
ocable personal consent establish between themselves
a partnership of the whole of life; this covenant is by
its very nature ordered to the good of the spouses and
to the procreation and education of children’, and ‘By
Christ’s institution, a valid marriage between bap-
tized persons is by that very fact a sacrament in which
the spouses are united by God […]’. (Can. 776 §1 and
2 CCEO)48
A Christian marriage bond is deemed exclusive and per-
manent; after all Christ himself has reportedly said, ‘So
then, they are no longer two but one flesh. Therefore
what God has joined together, let not man separate.’49
Because marriage is regarded as a union before God,
dissolving such a union is considered problematic. In
principle, all (Eastern) Churches prohibit divorce. Gen-
erally, however, the (non-Catholic) Orthodox Churches
take a more lenient stand on divorce and remarriage,
when compared to the Catholic Church. The Catholic
Church regards ‘indissolubility’ as an essential property
of marriage and therefore renounces the very word
‘divorce’ (talaq). A Catholic marriage can only be termi-
nated through nullification of a marriage (butlan al-
zawaj), meaning that the spouses have to prove that the
marriage was invalid from the very beginning. The
Catholic Church does accept annulment of a marriage
but only in exceptional cases. Marriage nullification
cases generally take a long time before a settlement is
reached, which might provide an additional discourage-
ment for a couple looking to divorce.50
The most common ground for contesting the validity of
a marriage investigated by the court of Damascus was
the claim that there was a defect of matrimonial consent
(Can. 817-827). A defective consent implies that one or
both parties do not have the necessary knowledge to
choose marriage and understand the obligations result-
ing from the marriage consent. The spouses have to
have the ability to understand and foresee and the will-
ingness to take on the essential obligations resulting
48. The English translations of the CCEO are taken from Canon Law Society
of America, Code of Canons of the Eastern Churches, Latin-English Edi-
tion, New English Translation (2001), at 295.
49. Matthew 19:6; New King James Version, 1982.
50. In the Damascus Catholic court, it generally took at least a year and a
half to conclude a butlan case.
from a marriage, such as the procreation of children, the
husband’s obligation to provide maintenance and cohab-
itation of the wife.51
3.3 Marital Rights and Duties According to the
CLPS
When we look at Catholic canon law, we see that the
maintenance–obedience equation is also obviously laid
down in the CLPS.52 Article 38 of the CLPS states that
all Eastern Catholics are subjected to the provisions of
the CCEO pertaining to marriage and the dissolution
thereof. According to the CCEO, the marriage covenant
‘is by its very nature ordered to the good of the spouses
and to the procreation and education of children’
(Can. 776). Canon 777 reads ‘[o]ut of marriage arise
equal rights and obligations between the spouses regard-
ing what pertains to the partnership of conjugal life.’53
But what exactly are these rights and obligations?
The CCEO does not provide a definition of ‘spousal
rights and obligations’. According to Pospishil, they are
determined by doctrinal writings and canonical juris-
prudence.54 Similar to the CCEO, the CLPS does not
elaborate on the concept of marital obligations in gener-
al. It does, however, pay considerable attention to the
issue of maintenance between the spouses (Articles
121-133). The husband has to provide financially for his
wife and family from the time a valid marriage is con-
cluded (Article 121). The maintenance (nafaqa) obliga-
tion includes food, clothing, housing and medical care
(Articles 107-108 CLPS). The wife for her part is
obliged to cohabit with her husband in the marital house
(Article 125). If, however, she leaves the marital house
without a valid reason, she is considered disobedient
and she consequently looses her right to maintenance
(Article 127). She is also considered disobedient when
she prevents her husband from entering her house or
when she refuses to move with him to a new house, pro-
vided she does so without any valid reason. A wife who
has been found guilty of marital disobedience or aban-
donment cannot claim maintenance for as long as the
period of abandonment continues (Article 128 CLPS).
In exceptional cases, a disobedient wife can be ordered
to pay maintenance to her husband to compensate for
damages she caused by leaving the conjugal house, but
only when the wife is well-off (Article 129 CLPS).
Thus, under the CLPS, a Catholic wife’s right to mari-
tal maintenance is made conditional upon her behaviour
and cohabitation.
51. V.J. Pospishil, Eastern Catholic Marriage Law: According to the Code of
Canons of the Eastern Churches (1991), at 337-339.
52. Similarly, the patriarchal family model is also visible in the other Christi-
an personal status law. For example, the husband is required to provide
maintenance for his wife and children (Arts. 33-35 Greek Orthodox PS
Law; Art. 34 Syriac Orthodox PS Law; Art. 31 Protestant PS Law). In
return, a Christian wife has to be obedient to her husband, which gen-
erally means that she is required to live with him and follow him wher-
ever he chooses to live (Art. 22 Greek Orthodox PS Law; Arts. 47-48
Armenian Orthodox PS Law; Art. 33 Syriac Orthodox PS Law; Art. 32
Protestant PS Law).
53. Canon Law Society of America, above n. 48, at 296.
54. Pospishil, above n. 51, at 197.
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3.4 Runaway Wives in the Catholic Court in
Damascus
Similarly, the concept of marital obedience, i.e. obedi-
ence of the wife, is found in the SLPS and the CLPS
alike. Akin to the SLPS, the Catholic law also ‘punishes’
a wife for leaving the marital home of her own accord:
for when she leaves the house, she looses her right to
nafaqa (Article 74 SLPS, Article 127 CLPS). Similar to
proceedings at the shar‘iyya courts (see above), a Catho-
lic husband can go to court to file a claim requiring the
wife to return to the marital home, i.e. a claim for mari-
tal obedience (da‘wa al-mutaba‘a) (see also case study
below). When the court receives such a claim, it will
have to investigate whether the wife has in fact left the
house and what the reasons for the abandonment (hajr)
are.55 A wife will be considered disobedient if she leaves
the marital home without his consent or without
informing him and she refuses to return (Article 127
CLPS). It is therefore important for the court to deter-
mine if the wife left the house voluntarily or if she was
sent away by her husband. Questions that need answer-
ing are: Did the wife leave the house on her own initia-
tive or was she ejected from the house by her husband?
Was and/or is she willing to return to the house volun-
tarily? If not, why does she refuse to return to her hus-
band’s house? Based on (witness) statements of the liti-
gants, family members and neighbours, the court tried
to establish a credible narrative so as to determine
whether the wife left of her own or her husband’s accord
(see below).
In Spring 2009, over the course of four months, I
observed court hearings at the first instance court of the
Catholic Church in Damascus. The court was housed in
a building on the premises of the Melkite Greek Zay-
toun church, tucked away in a calm spot amid the hustle
and bustle of the Christian quarter of the old city.
The Damascus’ Catholic court premises were a
haven of peace, especially compared to its shar‘iyya
counterpart.56 During the court’s office hours, lawyers,
litigants, and witnesses usually hovered around the
courtroom or were waiting in the designated waiting
room, chatting and drinking coffee with the clerk in his
office, while waiting their turn to enter the court. The
litigants and witnesses who frequented the court gener-
ally appeared to be from an urban, middle-to-upper-
class background, which is not surprising as Christians
in and around Damascus, as I was told, tend to belong
to the middle-to-upper-classes.
55. See article written by Fr. Antoun, senior judge in the first instance and
appeal of the Catholic court in Damascus: A. Moslih, ‘La legge sullo
statuto personale delle confessioni cattoliche’, 4 Il Regno Attualità,
135-138, at 138, n. 1 (2008).
56. It has to be noted that this is probably also due to the fact that the
Catholic judges are faced with a considerably lower number of cases,
compared to colleagues working at the shar‘iyya courts, if only because
the (total) number of Christians in Syria is much smaller (10 per cent of
the total population vs. roughly 85 per cent Muslims).
During my presence in the court, I counted a total of
213 cases.57 The majority of the cases brought to the
court were, by far, nullification of marriage petitions
(butlan al-zawaj). As mentioned earlier, the most com-
mon ground for contesting the validity of a marriage was
the claim that there was a defect of matrimonial consent,
which could mean that one or both parties did not have
the necessary knowledge to choose marriage and under-
stand the obligations resulting from a marriage. The
inability to assume and fulfil marital obligations has to
be proven in court by the petitioner, which were, in the
Damascus Catholic court, usually the husbands.58 Con-
trary to the shar‘iyya courts and the Greek Orthodox
court of Damascus where the majority of the petitioners
was predominantly female, this observation was also
supported by acquainted lawyers.59
The most commonly heard claim filed by men in this
regard was abandonment by the wife. An example of a
case that involved a husband who claimed his wife had
left the marital home is the following:
On a hot day in June, George60 presented three wit-
nesses to the Catholic court to support his claim that
his wife Hind was disobedient and had abandoned
him. The three witnesses were all male and appeared
to be somewhere between the age of 35-45. Besides
the litigants’ lawyers, Hind was also present. Howev-
er, she had to step outside the courtroom as soon as
the witness examinations began.
The court asked the first witness, a friend of George,
to give his account on the reason why the couple was
in disagreement which each other. He explained they
were often at variance with each other and that Hind
had left the conjugal house. The witness said George
told him that his wife was disobedient (nashiza). He
went on telling a tangled story about Hind being a
woman of questionable morals. The judge was visibly
annoyed with this garrulous witness; he cut him short
and dictated to the clerk: ‘There are several reasons
for the disagreement between the spouses but I do
not know what the main reason is.’ The court asked
whether the wife left the house of her own accord or
whether the husband expelled her from the conjugal
house. The witnesses related that Hind left the house
and went to the village of Marmarita to stay with her
57. The 213 cases ranged from cause-list sittings where lawyers handed in
documents or just came in to make an appointment for a next sessions,
but also cases that involved, for example, lengthy witness testimonies.
In addition, the majority of the 213 ‘cases’ include reappearing cases,
meaning that I saw several cases at different stages of the proceedings.
58. Of the 86 cases in which I was able to determine the gender of the
petitioner/respondent, the petitioner was male in 54 cases, and
32 times the petitioner was female. I have no explanation as to why
more men filed a butlan petition vis-à-vis women. Possibly it was a
question of money, as butlan proceedings are long and complicated.
Litigants need a lawyer to assist and guide them through the lengthy
and complex proceedings.
59. This corresponds to what has been observed in other Arab personal sta-
tus courts, i.e. the majority of petitions filed at the shar‘iyya courts are
initiated by women (see, e.g., Buskens 1999, above n. 2; Carlisle 2007,
above n. 2; Sonneveld 2012, above n. 2; Welchman 2000, above n. 2).
60. All names used in the cases studies are fictitious.
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family. The judge asked him who told him this. He
explained that he happened to be at their house when
Hind phoned her husband to tell him she had gone to
her family in Marmarita. Later she returned to the
marital home, accompanied by a friend, to collect her
belongings and other goods, such as cooking utensils.
The judge inquired whether the wife fulfilled her
marital duties (wajibat zawjiyya). The witness started
rattling away about Hind and failed to give a direct
answer to the court. Again the judge cut him short
and asked him: ‘He said she does not want children,
is that true?’ The witness answered by saying he did
not know, George did not tell him anything about
that. The questioning by the court continued but the
answers did not seem to satisfy the court or the law-
yers. Occasionally, the lawyers objected to the state-
ments of the witness, leading to counter-objections
against each other, much to the anger of the judge: ‘I
am in charge here, you talk to me, not to each other!’
The second witness, a neighbour and friend of
George, was able to give a more satisfying statement.
The witness told the court that Hind had no respect
for her husband. In answer to the court’s question
whether she deserted the conjugal house alone or
with her husband, he replied that George told him
that Hind had left the house alone. The judge asked
whether he thought she wanted to continue with the
marriage, he answered in the negative: ‘No, of course
not’. He added that her behaviour as a married wom-
an was generally disrespectful. One evening he saw
Hind out on the street with another man. He said
that it was inappropriate for a married woman to be
seen with another man in public. Furthermore,
whenever George and Hind had an argument, she
would leave the house, not to go her family but to
outsiders. Again, the witness thought this was inap-
propriate because she should go to her family instead,
who would help her to reconcile with her husband.
He said he visited the couple only once; however, he
saw her often – that is to say – he saw her out on the
street. He was therefore not surprised to hear that
George managed to obtain a performance claim for
marital obedience (tanfidh al-mutaba‘a). Finally, the
judge asked whether – to his knowledge – the wife
wanted to have children. The witness said she already
had a child from a previous marriage. He thought she
did not want to have more children. According to the
witness, George tried to reconcile with Hind but she
refused.61
According to these witnesses, Hind did not live up to
the domestic ideal of a housewife because she (allegedly)
deserted her husband and the conjugal house, and she
‘mixed and mingled’ with men in public. As marriage is
considered the only place for licit sexual relations, a
61. The third witness was also a neighbour; he lived in the same district
(hara). He gave a rather brief testimony, mainly because he either could
not answer the questions of the court or because his knowledge was
only based on hearsay (case P, Catholic first-instance court, 15 June
2009, Damascus).
wife’s sexuality is obviously directly connected to that of
her husband. One could say that Hind was expected to
keeping line with social decorum and behave modestly
and self-effacingly and not embarrass her husband and
family by mingling with unrelated men in public.
It is often claimed by Christians that Christian women
have more freedom than Muslim women, and that they
can interact more freely with the opposite sex because
Christians are not as obsessed with sexuality as Muslims
are.62 Christian or Muslim, a woman’s sexual virtue is
closely connected to a man’s masculinity, but there is a
difference. Rabo sums it up as follows:
To generalize, the ideal for Christian men is to be
able to protect their womenfolk and enable them to
mix and mingle in public space. The ideal for Mus-
lim men is to be able to protect their womenfolk from
mixing and mingling in public space. The ability to
both protect and control one’s own womenfolk is a
crucial aspect of Syrian masculinity.63
Even though Christian men generally allow and enable
‘their women’ to mix and mingle in public, some Chris-
tian female friends informed me, and as the case study
of Hind demonstrates, that, in all honesty, they could
not really mingle freely with unrelated men, even if they
were Christian, for the eyes of the community were
always watching (i.e. they feared it may lead to gossip).
This case provides a good example of expression of
norms and views on (im)proper spousal behaviour: ideas
about improper spousal behaviour on account of the
wife were clearly expressed by the witnesses, especially
by the second witness. His moral assessment of Hind’s
conduct was clear: a married woman should not interact
with unrelated men in public; when a couple has an
argument, they should turn to their families for help in
resolving their differences, and so on. The assessment of
a person’s character and/or behaviour is commonly
based on daily interactions. The reputation of an indi-
vidual or a family can be damaged, improved or rein-
forced through talk or gossip of neighbours, family or
other community members.64 Women are in a more vul-
nerable position than men when it comes to harmful
talk.65 To give an example, non-related men and women
are not expected to interact unsupervised in public; for
that reason, family members often control and restrict,
especially unmarried, women’s behaviour and mobility.
Gender segregation is oftentimes regarded as something
typical for Muslim communities, but, as became evident
from the above-described case and my observations in
general (i.e. other court cases and interactions with
Christian informants), the same conventions apply to
Christian communities. Fear of talk or gossip can be a
62. See A. Rabo, ‘“We Are Christians and We Are Equal Citizens”: Perspec-
tives on Particularity and Pluralism in Contemporary Syria’, 23 Islam and
Christian-Muslim Relations 1, 79-93, at 89-90 (2012).
63. Id., at 90.
64. See, e.g., A. Meneley, Tournaments of Value: Sociability and Hierarchy
in a Yemeni Town (1996).
65. M.E. Hegland, ‘Gossip’, in S. Joseph (ed.), Encyclopedia of Women in
Islamic Cultures, Vol II (2005) 210-214.
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powerful tool to ensure that men and women adhere to
their expected gender roles. Under the watchful eye of
family and community, individuals are expected to keep
in line with social decorum: ‘both men and women
should behave with constraint and modesty’.66
3.5 Proper Spousal Behaviour: Is She a Good
Housewife?
During butlan proceedings, witnesses were an important
source of information for the Damascus Catholic court,
for they clearly expressed whether or not a spouse (or
both) lived up or fell short of expectations as a wife or
husband. A negative assessment could be made on the
basis of seemingly simple acts as serving coffee for
guests, cooking or idling about at home. It should be
noted, however, that the witnesses’ – and with that the
court’s – assessment of the litigants’ performance as
husband or wife was usually strategically guided by their
lawyers. They prepared their litigants and witnesses
before they were interrogated by the court, making sure
their clients came across as a good wife or husband. In
order to prove to the court that the husband and/or wife
did (or did not) understand or did not want to take on
the essential obligations that result from a marriage (see
above).
During these examinations, the court tried to get an idea
of the seriousness of the disagreement (khilaf) between
the spouses, the circumstances leading up to the mar-
riage (i.e. the circumstances and length of courtship and
betrothal), the wedding day, marital life itself and so on.
The witnesses were asked to share their thoughts and
opinions with the court, preferably illustrated by exam-
ples. In the examination of witnesses, considerable
attention was given to the marital roles at stake. In case
the wife was accused of not being a good housewife, the
court asked whether she fulfilled her household duties
and whether the witness could attest to her negligence
(or diligence). For that reason, the witness’ questioning
usually focused on her role as a housewife. What did the
witness see when he or she visited the marital house?
Examples of domestic negligence heard in the Damas-
cus court included the following: ‘The house was not
clean’, ‘She is always out’, ‘She does not cook, she buys
food from the market’, ‘She does not serve coffee or tea’
or ‘She serves cold coffee.’.
An example of a case in which views on what constitu-
ted as (im)proper spousal behaviour on account of the
wife was evidently expressed in the following witness
statements. In this court session, three witnesses were
presented to the court by the petitioner, i.e. the husband
(hereafter called Michel), who was in his late 30s.
Michel was married to Sawsan, who was about fifteen
years his junior.
The first witness was the mother of Michel, an elder-
ly woman originally from Iraq. The court’s first ques-
tion (as usual) was what the witness thought the rea-
son for the disagreement between the spouses was.
66. A. Rabo, A Shop of One’s Own: Independence and Reputation Among
Traders in Aleppo (2005), at 82.
The witness said the problems started shortly after
the marriage, Sawsan did not fulfil her household
duties or her marital duties (wajibat manziliyya wa
wajibat zawjiyya) and she always quarrelled in a loud
voice, in the presence of the neighbours. The judge
asked what the witness meant by marital duties,
whether she referred to sexual relations between the
spouses. She simply responded by saying that she
(Sawsan) was not close to him. The court asked
whether the wife had left the house without inform-
ing her husband. The witness answered in the affir-
mative and said Sawsan occasionally left the house at
9 a.m. only to return around midnight. She went on
to say: ‘Once she left the house and locked the door.
When my son returned from work, he could not enter
his house. He had to sleep at our [his parents] house.
When I asked her why she had done that, she replied
“It is my house!” While he pays everything for her!
She just buys many things, we do not know where
she gets the money from.’ The witness continued by
saying that the last time Sawsan left, she went with
her father and youngest brother and took all her gold
with her. The judge asked the witness whether she
knew if the wife wanted to return to the conjugal
home, she replied there had been several reconcilia-
tion sessions in church and in court. After the last
reconciliation in court, Sawsan called the police67 in
the evening and told Michel she wanted to divorce
him.
The second witness was an elderly man, the father of
Michel. The court asked him for the reason of the
disagreement. He answered that the first 20 days of
the marriage Sawsan behaved exemplary but then she
started to spread bad rumours about Michel and his
family. According to the witness, Sawsan had abso-
lutely no respect for her husband. Michel (his son)
was a good man, a person with high moral character.
She, on the other hand, was the opposite: she was an
ill-natured woman. The lawyer of the husband
agreed with the witness and added: ‘He really is a
very kind man, everyone likes Michel!’ The judge
continued to question the witness and asked if the
wife fulfilled her household duties. He answered that
she did not, because she did not cook nor clean: ‘She
does not know how to be a good wife – she serves
cold coffee!’ The judge asked who did the grocery
shopping. The witness said his wife and his daughter
usually did it, Sawsan rarely helped around the
house. The court pursued the question of abandon-
ment by the wife and asked whether she had left the
house of her own accord. The witness replied in an
ironic tone: ‘Ah! She is a woman of importance!’
After which he told the same story as his wife (the
first witness), about how Sawsan had left the house,
locked it (thereby shutting her husband out of the
house) and forcing him to spend the night with his
parents. The court asked whether there was a possi-
bility of reconciliation (musalaha). The witness did
67. I do not know the reason why Sawsan called the police.
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not think there was much hope because Sawsan
always said ‘I do not want to return’. She wanted to
divorce him; she already started saying this after two-
and-half months of marriage. Finally, Sawsan’s law-
yer asked the witness about their engagement period,
the witness explained that Michel’s family made
inquiries about Sawsan before the wedding among
her family members, in particular her mother and
siblings. Everything seemed perfectly normal, she
changed about ten days after the wedding.68
Leaving aside the likelihood that the witnesses were
primed by the petitioner’s lawyer and the question
whether or not the court was susceptible to their presen-
tation of the facts,69 the attachment to patriarchal
gender roles, values and expectations of what is or is
considered right and proper spousal behaviour clearly
manifested itself during these witness statements. In my
observation, witnesses presented to the Catholic court
often held and expressed opinions on the moral charac-
ter of the plaintiff/defendant, e.g. is he/she a good
man/woman; husband/wife; father/mother, as we saw
both in the case of George & Hind and the case of
Michel & Sawsan.
4 Conclusion
It has become evident that family relations in Syria are
not solely governed by laws of personal status issued by
the Syrian government. The state may regulate matters
of personal status through legislation and courts; how-
ever, this does not exclude the existence and influence
of norms produced by non-state ‘normative systems’,
such as culturally shared norms. The interaction
between various social, legal and religious norms (codi-
fied and uncodified) in the field of Syrian family law
cannot be underestimated. Ideas about morality and
proper or improper gender comportment in family and
marital relationships shaped and influenced legal dis-
courses and practices. Besides, legislative norms were
oftentimes not narrowly defined (e.g. provisions con-
cerning ‘spousal rights and obligations’ in the CCEO
and CLPS) and thus left ample room for interpretation
by the courts, which also invites the incorporation of
cultural or patriarchal norms into legal proceedings.
This does not mean that state law norms were necessari-
ly different from those non-statutory norms, for in fact
some of these latter norms were also laid down in the
various Syrian personal status laws.
In this article, I have also demonstrated that the patriar-
chal family model is enshrined in Syria’s personal status
68. The third witness was a woman in her 40s, she was Michel’s sister.
Generally, she told the same story as her parents. This latter witness
statement was wrapped up rather quickly, most likely because her
statements corresponded with the former two. Case S, Catholic first-
instance court, 4 May 2009, Damascus.
69. Since my fieldwork ended about two months later, I could not follow up
on the outcome of this case.
laws, Muslim and Catholic alike, and with that contrib-
uted to the preservation and confirmation of that model
in the Syrian legal context. Furthermore, in my obser-
vation, views and opinions on, for example, social and
marital propriety, obedience of women and upholding
the family honour, were continuously expressed by indi-
viduals in the different courtrooms and played an
important role in, most importantly, the assessment of
spousal behaviour of the parties involved. Participants
of the legal process, i.e. judges, litigants, lawyers, wit-
nesses and other ‘visitors’ to the courts, expressed or
emphasised (intentionally or unintentionally) the impor-
tance or commonality of these various norms and values,
for example, in their testimonies as litigants and wit-
nesses, as was demonstrated in the Catholic case studies.
It was during witness statements in particular where
patriarchal norms and views on marital life came to the
fore. In my opinion, it was the patriarchal family model
that determined the gender roles in Syrian society; it
was perhaps more powerful than the legal or religious
norms, specific to the different ethnic and religious
communities.
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